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WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN: CASE STUDY AND
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE DIFFERENCES IN THE FALL
FROM MATERNAL GRACE BY KHOUA HER AND ANDREA YATES
JAYNE HUCKERBY*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The disparate treatment of white, middle-class women and poor women of
color in the criminal justice system and contemporary popular discourse has
been well documented.1 However, less attention has been given to how this
harsher treatment of poor women of color manifests itself in the media coverage
of cases of infanticide. This paper aims to begin to fill this gap in the literature
by exploring the roles of race and culture, class, marital status, and biology in
the media’s treatment of two infanticidal women, Khoua Her and Andrea Yates.
On September 3, 1998, in St. Paul, Minnesota, Khoua Her, a Hmong immigrant
who had been living in the United States for several years,2 strangled her six
children and attempted suicide before calling 911 to report the incident.3 At the
time of the strangling, Her was a twenty-four-year-old working mother es-
tranged from her husband.4  She was ultimately sentenced to fifty years impris-
onment under the terms of a plea bargain that required her to plead guilty to six
counts of intentional second-degree murder for the killing of her children.5 On
June 20, 2001, in Clear Lake, Texas, Yates, a thirty-six-year-old white, middle-
class, fundamentalist Christian homemaker in a traditional marriage, drowned
her five children in the bath tub before calling 911 and her husband to report her
actions. On August 8, 2001, Yates pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two
* B.A., LL.B. (Hons 1), University of Sydney. I am indebted to Professor Ratna Kapur for su-
pervising this project, and for the exceptionally generous levels of feedback, knowledge-sharing and
encouragement that this supervision entailed; and to Peter De Neef for providing logistical support.
1. See generally Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 555 (arguing that the
failure of black single mothers to comply with categories imposed by a racist, sexist, and class-based
society results in their condemnation); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95,
105-109 (1993) (arguing that race and gender structure the interpretation of the severity of maternal
crime and the nature of sentences received ) [hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood]; Anna L. Tsing, Mon-
ster Stories: Women Charged With Perinatal Endangerment, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 282 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna L. Tsing eds., 1990) (outlining how the approach
of courts to mothers who have endangered newborns during unassisted births, varies according to
their race or class).
2. Her had been in the United States since 1988. See Lourdes Medrano Leslie & Curt Brown,
Mother: Killing Kids Saved Them From Suffering, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 9, 1999, at 1A
[hereinafter Mother: Killing Kids].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mother Gets Fifty Years for Killing Six Children, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 1, 1998,
at A8.
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charges of capital murder for the deaths of two of her sons and her daughter.6 To
support the insanity plea, Yates’s lawyers claimed that she was suffering from
postpartum depression at the time of the murders.7 She was determined com-
petent to stand trial,8 and on March 12, 2002 was found guilty of the two capital
murder charges.9 Three days later, on March 15, the jury deliberated for ap-
proximately 35 minutes before recommending a sentence of life in prison in-
stead of the death penalty,10 and Yates was formally sentenced on March 18,
2002.11  Yates will be eligible for parole in 2041,12 and her lawyers have submitted
notice of appeal.13  Both the reduction in penalty and the lodging of the appeal
are indicative of a general belief that Yates deserves some degree of leniency in
the punishment of her crimes.
Apart from the formal legal process, both women’s acts have been subject
to a precursory “trial by media.” This article will trace the different explanatory
narratives that emerge in these media trials, with some brief analysis of the post-
verdict media treatment to which Yates has been subject. Part II will discuss
what constitutes “valued motherhood” in this discourse, and trace the respec-
tive “worth” of the mothering done by Her and Yates as it is presented in the
media accounts of their crimes. Part III will outline the deployment of images of
“mad” and “bad” mothers in infanticide cases, and describe how the image of a
“mad” mother is more readily mobilized by the media to explain the actions of
white mothers who kill, than those of poor women of color.  Finally, Part IV will
consider the social, legal, and political functions served by labeling white
women “mad” and women of color “bad” in the treatment of infanticidal
women. In undertaking such an analysis, this article follows the line of a number
of postmodern accounts of motherhood and crime which highlight how society
generally delivers more punitive treatment to those women who do not meet the
ideal norms of motherhood, including poor women of color.14 However, by fo-
6. Note that Yates drowned all five of her children; however “one of the counts lists Noah and
John as two victims killed during the commission of the same crime, to qualify for capital punish-
ment. The second count lists the death of Mary as a child under age six. By not listing all of the chil-
dren in a single count, prosecutors avoid the possibility that an acquittal could void all of the
charges.” Pam Easton, Mom Found Fit for Trial in Drownings, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2001, at 19.
7. Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready for Trial, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 2001, at A30.
8. Easton, supra note 6; Bruce Nichols, Yates Found Competent for Trial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 23, 2001, at 42A [hereinafter Nichols, Yates Found Competent].
9. Bill Bickel, Andrea Yates, at http://crime.about.com/library/blfiles/blandreayates.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2002).
10. Carol Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for Forty Years, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
16, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/drownings/1298197 (last
visited Oct. 6, 2002).
11. Yates Family Points Fingers (Mar. 18, 2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/
14/national/main503693.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
12. Id.
13. Lisa Teachey, Lawyers Submit Notice of Appeal in Yates’s Murder Conviction Case, HOUS.
CHRON., Apr. 4, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/drownings/
1339777 (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
14. See ALLISON MORRIS, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 92 (1987) (noting the extrajudi-
cial comments of Scottish judges which indicate that women who are not good mothers are more
likely to be sent to prison than those considered to be appropriately performing the maternal role);
ANNE WORRALL, OFFENDING WOMEN: FEMALE LAWBREAKERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 88
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cusing on how this pattern of treatment plays out in the media in the context of
infanticide, where technically all of the offenders have drastically failed to meet
the ideal maternal myth because they have killed their children and therefore
theoretically should all be subject to similar levels of punitive treatment because
they are equally “bad,” it is hoped that the race/culture/class bases for dispa-
rate treatment will be brought into even sharper relief.
II.  THE MYTH OF MOTHERHOOD
A. Some Moms Are Better Than Others
It is axiomatic that when a mother kills her child(ren) she offends societal
myths of maternal grace and “mother love.”15 This inability to reconcile infanti-
cide with images of motherhood is a common theme of newspaper coverage of
infanticidal women.16 Such comments tend to associate motherhood with love
(“loving mothers don’t take the lives of their own children”)17 and acts with in-
herent character (“Ms. Yates’s act was not a mere variant of maternal behavior;
she was nature’s aberration”)18 with unquestioning ease. The result of these two
elisions is that the act of killing one’s child is considered so antithetical to the
behavioral norms of motherhood as to justify the “demotion” of status from
“mother” to the prematernal state of “woman.” For example, one newspaper
reader in arguing that Yates should never be released prefaced his comments
with a reference to Yates as “[t]he woman (not a ‘mother,’ by my reckoning)[.]”19
However, the fall from maternal grace is not the same for all infanticidal
mothers. This disparate treatment of women in infanticide cases has been well
noted.20 The disparate treatment has been primarily attributed to whether the
mother is classified as “mad” (resulting in more lenient treatment) or “bad” (re-
sulting in harsher treatment).21 However, it is necessary to go back a step in this
(1990) (noting the greater dispensability of women who do not meet the ideal norms of mother-
hood); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1436 (1991) (noting that “society is much more willing to
condone the punishment of poor women of color who fail to meet the middle-class ideal of mother-
hood”) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts].
15. Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (1996).
16. See Todd Lighty & Jeremy Manier, Society Faces the Unfathomable: Experts Find Women Are
Killing Their Children More Often Than Thought, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1999, at 1.
17. Mike Tolson, Unequal Justice: Criminal Punishment Widely Disparate in Maternal Filicide Cases
Such as Yates’, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 10, 2001, at 1.
18. Sally Satel, The Newest Feminist Icon–A Killer Mom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A26.
19. M. Hawkins, Outlook, Viewpoints, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at 3.
20. See Tolson, supra note 17 (stating, “Among women who kill their children for no apparent
reason, what really distinguishes one case from another is not the way they did it but the way they
are treated by the criminal justice system”). See also Brenda Barton, When Murdering Hands Rock the
Cradle: An Overview of America’s Incoherent Treatment of Infanticidal Mothers, 51 SMU L. REV. 591, 606
(1998). See generally Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder, Manslaugh-
ter, Madness or Miscellaneous?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1113 (2000); Karin Lewicki, Can You For-
give Her?: Legal Ambivalence Toward Infanticide, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683 (1999).
21. See Oberman, supra note 15, at 42-49; Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their In-
fants: The Mad and the Bad, 2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71, 73 (1991).
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analysis, and ask whether the “mad” or “bad” account of criminal mothers is
mobilized more readily with respect to some mothers than others, in order to
more closely examine the role of the media in mobilizing these images.  A useful
starting point for this exercise is a general recognition that not all criminal moth-
ers are subject to the same treatment by the criminal justice system or media. In-
stead, more punitive treatment is delivered to those women who do not meet
the ideal norms of “motherhood.”22
This disparate coverage and treatment of criminal mothers stems from the
fact that the concept of “motherhood” is neither innocuous nor universal, but
pretends to be both. Motherhood is not innocuous, as it is given meaning by the
core features of patriarchal ideology.23 It is not universal, because there are es-
sentially three main variables which determine the value that attaches to moth-
erhood: race,24 class,25 and the role that the father has in relation to both the
child(ren) and mother.26 The variables of race and class intersect in such a way
that the ideal norms of motherhood come to reflect the mothering done by
white, middle-class women.27 This ideological privileging divides mothers into
essentially two camps: the “Good Mothers” (white middle-class women) and
“out-group” mothers (women of color, poor women, lesbian women) who can-
not by definition be Good Mothers, and can, at best, hope to be Good Black
Mothers or Good Asian Mothers.28 Single mothers have also been described as
belonging in the less-valued group.29
Another measure of motherhood that is related to the variable of race and
culture, but is less often discussed, is religion. Generally, in Western culture, a
Christian mother will have a higher claim to motherhood than a non-Christian
mother because the former is more readily seen as embodying the “Christian”
virtues of benevolence, forgiveness, and tolerance–virtues that are also per-
ceived to be the hallmarks of good mothering.  However, the extent to which re-
ligion determines the value of motherhood is ultimately mediated by considera-
tions of race and culture. For example, in popular discourse the Christian
identity of an immigrant woman of color does not automatically make her as
22. See generally Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1; Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note
14.
23. Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 289-90 (1991)
[hereinafter Fineman, Images of Mothers]. See generally Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 653, 662 (1992) (discussing how patriarchy shapes the family context and the role of
the mother within this context).
24. Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 105 (stating that “societal concepts of race and class
determine the meaning of maternal selflessness”).
25. Id.
26. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 42 (1976) (describing how “[m]otherhood is ‘sacred’ so
long as its offspring are ‘legitimate’—that is, as long as the child bears the name of a father who le-
gally controls the mother”) [hereinafter Rich, Of Women Born].
27. Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 105.
28. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood,
the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1305
(1992).
29. ADRIENNE RICH, Motherhood in Bondage, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE : SELECTED PROSE,
1966-1978 195, 196 (1979) (describing how unmarried, welfare, and lesbian mothers are not valued
by society) [hereinafter Rich, Motherhood in Bondage].
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“good” a mother as a white Christian woman.30 This is because the immigrant
mother is more susceptible to arguments about how Christian she really is, that
is, the extent to which her exposure to Christianity has successfully civilized her
and eradicated her “otherness.”31
Finally, the societal value placed on motherhood also depends on the rela-
tionship of the father with the mother and child.32 This third variable functions
such that value only attaches to motherhood if there is a father who enjoys legal
control over mother and child.33 This version of motherhood emphasizes pater-
nal presence and control. Therefore, in this version, single mothers have less en-
titlement to motherhood than their married counterparts.34
The permutations of these variables in relation to this present case study
are clear. In popular discourse, Andrea Yates as a white, middle-class mother
with a supportive husband enjoys a higher moral claim to motherhood than
Khoua Her, an immigrant mother with an estranged husband. The factors that
support these differential claims were made explicit in the media portrayals of
these two women and will be discussed below.
B. Her vs. Yates in the Motherhood Stakes
From the perspective of media reports, Her “fails” on all of the indicia of
good motherhood: she is a racial and cultural other, she is poor, and she is a sin-
gle mother. In relation to the first characteristic, Her’s life story is one that is told
in the media through the lens of culture and “otherness.” Media accounts make
it patently clear that Her was not originally from the United States. Her’s out-
sider status is reinforced through the numerous references to the fact that she
was a Hmong immigrant, who had spent eight years in the Ban Vinai refugee
camp in Thailand prior to coming to the United States.35 The repeated descrip-
tions of Her’s experience in this refugee camp also have an alien and primitive
quality that is designed to set her apart from the Western world which she now
inhabits. For example, reports refer to her repeated rapes (Her’s own lawyer
comments that “[s]he was tortured her whole life. . . .  She was treated worse
than you would treat an animal or a slave”) and her forced child marriage (in
this camp she met her husband, Hang, whom she was “forced” to marry at a
young age).36
Much is also made of the fact that Her’s first pregnancy was at age thirteen;
for example, Deu Yang, a parenting nurse, is quoted as saying, “My first impres-
30. This theme was the subject of discussions and e-mail correspondence with Professor Ratna
Kapur during Fall Semester, 2002, while I was a student in the Feminist Legal Theory class taught by
Professor Kapur at New York University School of Law.
31. Id.
32. Fineman, Images of Mothers, supra note 23, at 289-90.
33. RICH, Of Women Born, supra note 26, at 42.
34. See RICH, Motherhood in Bondage, supra note 29 (regarding society’s view of unmarried moth-
ers); Fineman, Images of Mothers, supra note 23, at 285-89 (discussing how single mothers are viewed
as “pathological” creatures).
35. Mother: Killing Kids, supra note 2; Mitchell Zuckoff, Community Left Grieving at Death of Six
Children, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1998, at A1.
36. Id.
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sion when I saw her was: Wow, she’s so young and she has a baby already.”37 It
was also stated that Her “became pregnant at age 12, and by 19 she had six chil-
dren.”38 A number of articles effectively defined Her by this status as a young
mother: “the 24-year-old-woman, a mother since she was 13[.]”39 Combined with
reference to her large number of children (six),40 these allusions draw implicitly
on the stereotype of women of color as lacking control over their sexuality and
“wantonly” having a succession of children.41  The fact that Her continued to
have children at such a young age while in the United States is implicitly pre-
sented as further evidence of her outsider status; her experience of living in
Western culture has not sufficiently civilized her to conform to its birthing and
marital practices. The following letter to the editor expresses disconcert with the
fact that Hmong culture continued to be pervasive in Her’s life, despite her
presence in the United States:
Is culture always good? A 13-year-old girl marries an 18-year-old boy. She has
her first child before they come to the United States. Once here she has five more
children. This girl was pregnant virtually every year that she was a teenager….
In Minnesota it is against the law to have sex with a child under the age of 16,
even if the child consents to the act. You can’t marry a child under the age of
16. . . .  We are told this marriage pattern is part of Hmong culture. Well, slavery
was once part of U.S. culture, female genital mutilation is part of several cul-
tures and child marriage with many children is part of many cultures. Just be-
cause something is a part of a culture does not mean it is good or acceptable.
Cultural sensitivity should not include something clearly wrong. No teenager
should have to spend her teen years bearing and caring for children.42
The fact that Her (like Yates), by being a Christian, did act consistently with one
important aspect of majoritarian culture in the United States, was insufficient to
overcome her position as an outsider. In fact, Her’s Christian identity was
scarcely reported in the media.43 When religion was discussed, the reference was
to Her’s detriment. For example, the prosecutor stated to the media: “I know
that she did this for religious reasons….  But to me, that doesn’t have anything
to do with mental state. If you have a mental state where you can’t control your-
self without some medication, we treat that differently from someone who de-
cides to do something for religious reasons.”44 Moreover, the prosecutor’s asser-
tion that Her acted with religious motivation is surprising because it is not based
37. Nurse Deu Yang visited the couple’s apartment to teach parenting skills as part of a health
education program; see Lourdes Medrano Leslie & Curt Brown, A Young Mother Accused of Murder,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 15, 1998, at 1A [hereinafter A Young Mother].
38. Mother Who Killed Her Children Gets Fifty Years, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1999, at 4.
39. Zuckoff, supra note 35.
40. Mother, Twenty-Four, Accused of Killing Six Kids Was No Stranger to Police, HOUS. CHRON.,
Sept. 5, 1998, at 14 [hereinafter Mother, Twenty-Four, Accused] (stating, “When her babies started to
arrive, they came almost every year”).
41. Charles L. Briggs & Clara Mantini-Briggs, Bad Mothers and the Threat to Civil Society: Race,
Cultural Reasoning, and the Institutionalization of Social Inequality in a Venezuelan Infanticide Trial, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 299, 337 (2000).
42. Rebecca Korn, Letters from Readers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 10, 1998, at 24A.
43. For example, only one article made reference to Her’s Christianity, quoting a co-worker’s
description of Her as “a very strong Christian.” Zuckoff, supra note 35.
44. Tolson, supra note 17.
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on her own explanations for the actions. Her’s repeated explanation was that she
killed the children out of love:45 “I loved my children the most….  If I died, then
nobody will love my children.”46 While altruistic murder-suicide may be given
cultural content47 or religio-cultural content in some situations, there is no real
suggestion that this was the legal strategy of Her and her lawyers. In light of
this, the prosecutor’s unfounded resort to religious explanations may be implic-
itly founded on an assumption that the actions of women like Her cannot be
based on autonomous decisions, but are instead referable to the binding forces
of religion and culture of which they are victims. 48
Her’s cultural otherness and difference were also reinforced by the few re-
ports that exoticized Her as an Asian woman. For example, one report described
Her’s 911 call in the following terms: “Khoua Her wore a traditional silk gown,
her black hair flowing over its blood-red hues, as she dialed 911 to report that she
had just killed her three sons and three daughters. To her elegant appare l. . . [she]
. . . added a gruesome accessory, a length of cord wrapped around her own
neck”49 (emphasis added). This exoticization is inconsistent with the more nu-
merous references to the fact that Her was a poor mother whose poverty and
seemingly listless existence were primarily conveyed through the description of
her home: a “beige stucco apartment” in the McDonough Homes housing proj-
ect.50
The relationship of Her’s husband vis-à-vis Her and their children also di-
minished her claims to valued motherhood. Her was a single mother,51 a patho-
logical52 creature in popular discourse. Although the children were “legitimate”
in the sense that they bore her husband’s name, under the patriarchal model of
motherhood, Her lessened her status as “mother” when she consciously pre-
vented her husband from controlling her (for example, on June 9, 1998, Her had
“an order of protection issued against Tou Hang, prohibiting contact for one
year”)53 and the children. This act of gaining custody of the children prevented
Hang from “holding their children hostage” to ensure Her’s vulnerability.54 The
notion that the killing of the children is a proprietal wrong against the father
45. Lourdes Medrano Leslie & Curt Brown, Mother Guilty of Choking Six, STAR TRIB. (Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul), Dec. 1, 1998, at 1A [hereinafter Mother Guilty].
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 84-91 (1994) (discussing  People v. Helen Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991)).
48. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2001).
49. Zuckoff, supra note 35. See also Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Mother Charged with Murder
of Six Children, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 9, 1998, at 1A (in which Sheila Hoff, among
the first people on the scene, described in her report that Her was wearing a “red ceremonial type
dress”).
50. Jon Jeter, In Disintegration of a Marriage, Six Children Are Strangled, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1998,
at A2.
51. See, e.g., Chris Graves et al., A Father’s Pain, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 5, 1998,
at 1A [hereinafter Graves, A Father’s Pain]; Mitchell Zuckoff, Mother Charged in Killings, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1998, at A4.
52. Fineman, Images of Mothers, supra note 23, at 285-289.
53. A Young Mother, supra note 37.
54. Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 102.
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and therefore deserving of severe punishment is encapsulated in Hang’s state-
ment: “She killed all six of my children and I would like to ask: Does the law of
this country say only 50 years for killing six people?”55
In addition, the comments of other Hmong mothers in the story (Her’s
mother, Pla Vang, and Her’s mother-in-law, Pang Yang) rather than illuminat-
ing how the virtues of motherhood are not culturally determined, are presented
by the media in such a way as to highlight Her’s failure to be sufficiently “moth-
erly” even within the perception of her own culture. This failure is illuminated
by Her’s mother’s contrasting display of the virtues of devoted and supportive
motherhood: “in my heart, I would think she does not have the capacity to kill
her children, but the child is mine, so I still love her.”56 Pang Yang, the children’s
paternal grandmother, similarly expresses appropriate maternal forgiveness,
patience, and wisdom when she states that “I have a lot of anger that all my
grandchildren are dead, but I also have a lot of love for her. . . .  But it is clear,
she did not love herself.”57
The media’s construction of Yates as a more valued mother is striking in
contrast. The fact that Yates is a white mother is notable in its omission from re-
ports on the killings. Further, the references to Yates’s former profession as a
nurse,58 and accounts of how she cared for her father in his final stages of ill-
ness,59 suggest that she possesses the requisite “caring” qualifications for moth-
erhood. The fact that Yates and her husband are fundamentalist Christians60
further suggests that there is some religious foundation for Yates’s possession of
these virtues of patience, selflessness, and benevolence. Moreover, the fact that
Yates is a fundamentalist Christian suggests that she is a particularly devoted and
righteous Christian, in contrast to Her, whose cultural influences may have
thwarted the full civilizing effect of the Christian message.
These “caring” qualities are presented as manifesting themselves in Yates’s
attention to the educational welfare of her children, as in the description of Yates
as a “devoted, home-schooling mother.”61 The home-schooling is not the only
way in which Yates is portrayed as being central to her children’s lives and their
home environment. The description of Yates as a homemaker, and the fact that
she and her husband are recent occupants of a “new house”62 (as distinct from
the public housing project inhabited by Her) give the impression that Yates’s
sense of self is very much constituted by the performance of maternal and
housekeeping duties in a pleasant home. Interestingly, in contrast to Her, the
fact that Yates and her husband planned to have “as many babies as nature will
55. Mother Guilty, supra note 45.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. E.g., Julie Cart, Houston Mother Ruled Competent to Stand Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at
A34; Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready For Trial, supra note 7.
59. Margery Eagan, Yates Shatters Maternal Myth of Competence, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 11, 2001,
at 4.
60. See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, Don’t Give Dads the Brush-Off, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2001, at 23.
61. Description by Russell Yates, in Lee Hancock, In a House of Death, Husband Sorts Out Life,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 30, 2001, at 1A.
62. Jim Yardley, Medical Records Tell a Story of Mother’s Deep Depression, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 9, 2001, at A4.
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allow”63 was portrayed negatively in the media, not because it represented
reckless birth practices per se, but because of the potential danger that further
births posed to Yates in light of her psychotic depression.64
However, it is primarily through her husband that Yates’s experience of
motherhood acquires its value. The paternal presence in this family structure is
clearly omnipotent. In some accounts, Yates’s identity is considered solely in
relation to her status as a married woman: “Mrs. Yates, the wife of a NASA en-
gineer[.]”65 The plethoric references to the fact that Russell Yates is a “NASA
computer engineer”66 further the impression that this is an economically sound,
respectable, middle-class family. Moreover, Russell Yates has on numerous oc-
casions expressly conferred “Good Mother” status on his wife. In the immediate
aftermath of the events, he publicly stated, “She loved our kids. Anybody that
knew her knew that.”67 This avowed support continues to be the “most impor-
tant thing” for Russell Yates.68 In addition, the fact that Russell Yates continues
to refer to the children as “our” children (for example, the website he estab-
lished, www.yateskids.org, is dedicated to “honor[ing] the memory of our chil-
dren, Noah, John, Paul, Luke, and Mary, who died tragically on June 20,
2001[,]”69 (emphasis added) means that the line of parentage between Yates and
the children remains intact in the eyes of the father and subsequently those
privy to his message. The inclusion of family Christmas photos from 1996 until
the present on the website reinforces this notion of a well-parented, intimately
connected, nuclear family.70
This discussion of media reports tends to provide further evidence for what
we already have seen: poor immigrants and women of color (such as Her) are
considered “lesser” mothers than white, middle-class mothers (such as Yates).
The punitive treatment of Her is consistent with postmodern accounts of moth-
erhood and crime, which describe how the failure of women like Her to meet the
purportedly universal standard of motherhood results in harsher treatment be-
cause American society is more willing to condemn these “dispensable”71
women.72 In effect, the “double jeopardy” (in breaking both the criminal law and
societal expectations)73 to which women offenders are subject, becomes a “triple
jeopardy” for poor women of color because their precrime status already con-
stitutes an inherent offense to societal norms.
63. Laura Parker, ‘Psychotic,’ But Is Andrea Yates Legally Insane?, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001, at
A1.
64. See, e.g., id. (quoting Yates’s psychiatrist as saying, “Patient and husband plan to have as
many babies as nature will allow! This will surely guarantee further psychotic depression.”).
65. Bruce Nichols, High-Profile Doctor Hired by Yates Prosecutors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
31, 2001, at 19A [hereinafter Nichols, High-Profile Doctor].
66. E.g., Cart, supra note 58; Michelle McCalope, Doctor: Texas Mother Saw ‘Satan,’ WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A28; Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready For Trial, supra note 7.
67. Texas Woman Faces Capital Murder Charges in Children’s Drowning Deaths, at http://www8.
cnn.com-/SPECIALS/2001/yates/stories/overview.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2002).
68. Hancock, supra note 61.
69. Russell Yates, Yates Kids Home Page, at http://www.yateskids.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
70. See, Id.
71. Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 105-106.
72. WORRALL, supra note 14, at 88; Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 14, at 1436.
73. VIRGINIA B. MORRIS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: WOMEN WHO KILL IN VICTORIAN FICTION 8-9 (1990).
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But what this paper has not yet addressed is how “Good Mothers,” like
Yates, manage to receive more lenient media treatment in infanticide cases; it
would appear that by the very act of killing their children they have caused the
greatest offense to the maternal myth possible, and certainly an offense greater
than merely being  poor or a person of color.  Indeed, where does a higher moral
claim to motherhood take a mother who kills her child? Surely, white, middle-
class mothers who kill their children are more disruptive to the myth of mother-
hood of which they are the “poster girls” than “out-group” mothers of whom
society had lower expectations anyway. Should not this gross insider betrayal
warrant the full wrath of the community, media, and the law? The reason why
this does not result is that punishment is subsidiary to the greater goal of main-
taining the status quo myth of white, middle-class motherhood. The third sec-
tion of this paper identifies how the two legal and social narratives of explana-
tion for infanticide (that a mother was “mad” or “bad”) are differentially
employed in order to preserve this myth and also identifies other functions
served by this differential application of the labels of “mad” and “bad.” How-
ever, first it is necessary to outline how the concepts of “mad” and “bad” moth-
ers are deployed in infanticide cases. This paper will explore specifically how
this dichotomy was set up in the pretrial media treatment of Her and Yates and
in the coverage after the guilty verdict was rendered in the Yates trial.
III.  MAD MOTHERS, BAD MOTHERS, AND INFANTICIDE
A. What it Means to be Labeled Either “Mad” or “Bad”
There is a general pattern of “leniency” with respect to infanticidal moth-
ers.74  However, within this general pattern of leniency, there are palpable differ-
ences in sentencing outcomes, depending on whether the defendant is classified
as a “mad” or “bad” mother.75 This bifurcation is a manifestation of the general
tendency to categorize criminal women as either afflicted by their hormones or
by evil.76 Although invocation of “madness” as an explanation for infanticide
does not guarantee exoneration,77 on the whole women who are perceived as
being pathological are punished less severely than those who are deemed
“evil.”78 The definition of the latter type of mother appears to be met if a mother
is “depraved,” that is, “ruthless, selfish, cold, callous, neglectful of [her] children
or domestic responsibilities, violent or promiscuous.”79
74. Oberman, supra note 15, at 42.
75. Id. at 43.
76. Wilczynski, supra note 21, at 74.
77. For example, one study indicates that in the past five years, over twenty women facing in-
fanticide charges have introduced evidence alleging that they were suffering from postpartum de-
pression or postpartum psychosis. Of these twenty women, about half of the women have been ac-
quitted, one quarter have received sentences ranging from eight to twenty years in prison to life in
prison, and one quarter have received light sentences, even probation. Gail Diane Cox, Postpartum
Defense: No Sure Thing, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 3.
78. See, e.g., Oberman, supra note 15, at 43; Wilczynski, supra note 21, at 74.
79. Wilczynski, supra note 21, at 74.
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However, the categories of “mad” and “bad” are not immutable.80 The con-
cept of madness is capable of multiple meanings in at least two senses. First, the
concept of madness with respect to infanticidal women varies according to dif-
ferent jurisdictions. A number of countries have specific infanticide statutes or
provisions which vary in the extent to which they create a presumptive link
between childbirth and insanity.81  For example, the English Infanticide Act of
1938 creates82 this link by providing that:
Where a woman by any willful act or omission causes the death of her child un-
der the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance
of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the
effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation conse-
quent upon the birth of the child, she . . . shall be guilty. . . of . . . infanticide.83
This approach has been critiqued as “inappropriately broad.”84 At the other end
of the spectrum lies the “myopic American position.”85 This approach requires
that women assert and prove mental illness,86 most commonly87 under the
M’Naghten rule of insanity, which determines whether defendants knew and
understood the nature and quality of their acts, and if they did know, whether
they knew what they were doing was wrong.88 “Postpartum disorders” is the
umbrella heading for the mental illness89 drawn upon by infanticidal mothers
who rely on the insanity defense. However, not all postpartum disorders suffi-
80. Oberman, supra note 15, at 47.
81. Id. at 17-19 (“At a minimum, infanticide [statutes] refer . . . to mothers who kill infants to
whom they have given birth. Aside from this fact, however, the laws vary in breadth and leniency.”).
82. Judith A. Osborne, The Crime of Infanticide: Throwing Out the Baby With the Bathwater, 6 CAN.
J. FAM. L. 47, 55 (1987).
83. English Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1). See also R. Kumar & Maureen
Marks, Infanticide and the Law in England and Wales, in POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PICTURE
PUZZLE 258, 269 (James A. Hamilton & Patricia N. Harberger eds., 1992) (stating, “The infanticide
law assumes a link between childbirth and lactation . . . and disturbance of balance of mind, but it
does not require proof of any physiological basis for either the offence or the occurrence of illness.”).
84. Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 1098, 1100 (2000).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1099.
87. See, for example, Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK. L. REV. 625,
636-646 (1991), for an outline of the different tests of insanity (the M’Naghten rule of insanity; the “ir-
resistible impulse” test; American Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code test; “product” or Durham
test; the federal statutory definition test; and the guilty but not mentally ill verdict) and an analysis
of how postpartum psychosis fares under each test.
88. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). For unsuccessful use of the M’Naghten test,
see references to Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979) and Commonwealth v. Reilly 549 A.2d 503
(Pa. 1988) in Barton, supra note 20, at 598.
89. In 1994, the American Psychiatric Association recognized postpartum onset as a mental
condition, stating that “[i]nfanticide is most often associated with postpartum psychotic episodes
that are characterized by command hallucinations to kill the infant or delusions that the infant is
possessed, but it can also occur in severe postpartum mood episodes without such specific delusions
or hallucinations.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 422 (4th ed. text revision 2000).
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ciently affect cognitive function so as to support an insanity plea.90 Of the three
classes of postpartum disorder, postpartum depression, or “baby blues,”91 severe
postpartum depression,92 and postpartum psychosis,93 technically only the
symptoms of postpartum psychosis would support a M’Naghten finding of in-
sanity.94 The plea has been successful, for example, where the mother reports
hearing voices telling her that her child is the devil95 or the disassociation from
the act is so great that the mother testifies that “she had seen two hands which
she did not recognize holding pillows over the newborns’ faces.”96
However, mention of these textbook cases should not obscure the fact that
the exculpatory label of “madness” is applied in situations where women are
not necessarily legally insane, or even in situations where insanity has not been
formally pleaded.97 This is the second sense in which it can be said that the cate-
gory of madness does not have a fixed meaning. It has been argued that the con-
90. Laura E. Reece, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Infanticide, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 699, 741 (1991).
91. Although estimates of the percentage of women affected by the “baby blues” vary some-
what, it is generally accepted that between 50% and 80% of women suffer this temporary mild de-
pression within a few days after childbirth. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 20, at 602 (describing it as “a
mild depression and anxiety condition” which more than two thirds of women experience within
four to five days following childbirth); Dobson & Sales, supra note 84, at 1104 (placing the figure of
women who have this experience at 25% to 85%, noting that it begins within a few days of childbirth
and can last from a “few hours to a few days”); Nelson, supra note 87, at 626 (characterizing the
“baby blues” as a slight temporary condition which 50% to 80% of women experience within three to
fifteen days of childbirth, and which “clear[s] up in a few hours or days”); Reece, supra note 90, at
711 (describing it as a temporary condition affecting 50% to 80% of women).
92. Postpartum depression is a more serious, potentially less temporary, condition that is expe-
rienced by a lower percentage of women (approximately 10%). See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 87, at 626
(stating that eight to twelve percent of women experience this condition, which can last “several
months” and “tend[s] to appear after the twentieth day postpartum”); Reece, supra note 90, at 712
(estimating that 10-20% of women experience this). See generally description in Dobson & Sales, supra
note 84, at 1105 (providing a thorough discussion of postpartum depression).
93. It is generally estimated that only one in one thousand new mothers suffering from post-
partum depression develops this psychosis, which is characterized by symptoms such as delusions,
hallucinations, agitation, and sleep deprivation, among others. See, e.g, Deborah K. Dimino, Postpar-
tum Depression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill Their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 233 (1990);
Dobson & Sales, supra note 84, at 1106 (describing the condition as one that affects “approximately
0.2% of childbearing women”); Nelson, supra note 87, at 626-27 (stating that one in every thousand
women suffer the symptoms described, such as delusions); Oberman, supra note 15, at 33 (putting
the figure of women who suffer at one to two new mothers in every thousand).
94. See, e.g., Reece, supra note 90, at 740-741 (noting that a woman who experiences postpartum
depression but not a postpartum psychotic reaction may not qualify for an insanity defense under a
statute with only a cognitive prong).
95. People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), review granted and opinion su-
perseded by 798 P.2d 1212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). On the day that Massip ran over her child with the car,
she heard voices telling her that her son was the devil. Debra Cassens Moss, Postpartum Psychosis
Defense, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 22. The jury found Massip guilty of second-degree murder, how-
ever, quite unusually, the trial judge intervened by finding that Massip suffered from postpartum
psychosis and that she was therefore not guilty by reason of insanity. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
96. This is what reportedly occurred in the case of Ann Green. Ann Green was found not guilty
by reason of insanity of killing two of her newborns and attempting to kill a third, and was commit-
ted to a state mental hospital for psychiatric evaluations as an outpatient. People v. Green, No. 1273-
86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 1988).
97. Oberman, supra note 15, at 43-44.
HUCKERBY.DOC 09/29/03  9:53 AM
WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 161
cept and scope of madness in infanticide cases is deliberately nebulous, so that
judges, juries, and the media can selectively draw upon it to provide leniency for
women whom they believe deserve sympathetic treatment.98 One New York
study of the insanity defense found that:
[W]hile from psychiatric reports, it is apparent that some of these mothers were
grossly insane at the time of the infanticidal acts (e.g., believed child was turning
into evil beings), there are others whose primary difficulty seemed to be one of
personal inadequacy and, more specifically, an inadequacy in the wife-mother-
homemaker roles, with resulting stress. Basically, it is our belief that society, in
its desire to preserve an illusion of “mother love,” is hesitant to carefully scruti-
nize the mother-child relationship and recognize realistically that the most rea-
sonable target for a mother’s frustration and anger is her child. Instead, to pre-
serve our illusions about “mother love,” we categorize women who murder
their children as “insane.”99
However, clearly not all women who murder their children are categorized as
insane. Instead, the symptoms of feelings of inadequacy in the maternal role can
be construed as insane reactions to the stress of motherhood in the case of some
women, but as simply “bad” mothering in the case of others.  Given the malle-
ability of the notions of “mad” and “bad” mothers and the importance that at-
taches to these categories in terms of sentencing outcomes, the media’s pretrial
perspective on why an infanticidal mother struggled with the maternal role be-
comes very important.
B. Her and Yates—(Not) Coping with Motherhood
Her was clearly under pressure in performing the simultaneous roles of
mother, worker, provider, and homemaker. One newspaper report states that a
review of police and court records and dozens of interviews with friends and
relatives “portray[s] a young woman so depressed and burdened by financial
and emotional pressures that she could no longer cope.”100 A similar, oft-cited
observation was that made by Mai Xiong, the friend of Her’s boyfriend, who
shared that Her “regretted marrying so young” and “was depressed over the
amount of responsibility she had.”101 Her herself confirmed this in the statement
made at her sentencing: “There was too much I can’t handle . . . I had six kids. I
was a single mom with no one to turn to . . .  I am not a bad person.”102
However, this depression and anxiety with respect to the performance of
the maternal role were not construed as a pathological condition, warranting
more lenient treatment. In the media they were instead linked to Her’s own im-
maturity and selfishness. For example, Mai Xiong provided the impetus for this
link when she stated: “She basically missed out on all her teen-age years. She
wanted to have fun.”103 The constant references to Her having a “new” boy-
98. Id. at 47.
99. Id. at 43 (quoting Henry J. Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in A REPORT TO
GOV. HUGH L. CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK, 37, 68-69 (1978)).
100. A Young Mother, supra note 37.
101. Mom, Twenty-Four, Held in Deaths of Six Kids, DENV. POST, Sept. 5, 1998, at A11.
102. Mother: Killing Kids, supra note 2.
103. Mother, Twenty-Four, Accused, supra note 40.
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friend,104 who may have lived with her and the children,105 implicitly reinforced
the notion that Her was exercising the frivolous sexuality that had been denied
to her by virtue of her culturally mandated early marriage.
Her was also apparently penalized for trying to retain power in her home,
rather than remaining weak and overawed by her maternal role.106 Rather than
being construed as a means of providing for her children, the fact that Her had a
job as a telemarketer was seen as another way in which she failed to spend time
with her children. For example, Hang reportedly “accused his wife of neglecting
the children by coming home late from work.”107 Her’s work commitments were
also portrayed as requiring the delegation of the performance of her maternal
duties, not only through the hiring of a babysitter,108 but also through reliance on
her estranged husband. This failure of Her to autonomously perform her house-
hold duties was reported in the following terms: “According to Tou Hang and a
neighbor of the family, for much of the marriage, Hang had watched the kids–
walked them to the school bus, made meals and bathed them–while his wife
worked in an office.”109
Likewise, Her’s absence from the home110 seems to be one of the major
“charges” leveled against her in the media. Again, Hang is the source of indict-
ing reports about Her “coming home late from work” and “running away [from
home] repeatedly.”111 Also published was Hang’s recollection of another incident
when “he brought police to Her’s townhouse late one night after he found the
children alone while their mother was at a party” and discovered that “10-year-
old Koua Eai was cooking an overly salty dinner for his five younger siblings.”112
Her therefore was also presented as someone who endangered the physical
health of her children. A number of newspaper reports repeated verbatim the
observations of Christopher Yang, a twenty-seven-year-old neighbor, who
stated that Her did not seem to supervise the kids closely.113 Yang’s ultimate and
well-aired assessment of Her’s mothering skills was that she seemed like
“someone who was not really taking care of her kids.”114
Her’s children had been subject to the surveillance of social services.
“[S]ocial workers talked with Her about the dangers of leaving her children
alone” and “wrote letters to both parents underscoring mandatory school atten-
104. Chris Graves, Thousands Pay Respect to Slain Children, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept.
13, 1998, at 3B; Mother, Twenty-Four, Accused, supra note 40; Mom, Twenty-Four, Held in Deaths of Six
Kids, supra note 101.
105. Jeter, supra note 50.
106. See Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 117 (describing the way courts more harshly penal-
ize “mothers who struggle to retain power in their homes”).
107. A Young Mother, supra note 37.
108. Id.
109. Graves, A Father’s Pain, supra note 51.
110. Neighbors reportedly stated that Her “sometimes left the home without her children.” Jeter,
supra note 50.
111. A Young Mother, supra note 37.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Mother, Twenty-Four, Accused, supra note 40.
114. Id.
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dance” after one of her sons skipped school.115 However, the county documents
ultimately indicate that the situation was not considered sufficiently serious as
to warrant intervention: “Child protection services were determined not to be
needed,”116 and a social worker confirmed that “the kids. . .always seemed well
nourished and there were never any signs like bruises.”117 Despite this evidence,
the perception that Her had maltreated her children lingered, and may have
been a reason why Her’s altruistic murder-suicide explanation118 was neither
fully accepted nor widely canvassed.
Yates was also by all accounts an overwhelmed mother. One report de-
scribed Yates as “feeling isolated, incompetent and overwhelmed.”119 Another
recorded Yates’s statement to police that “she had considered killing her chil-
dren for months because she thought she was a  bad mother and that they were
‘hopelessly damaged.’”120  Another article undertook a review of evidence
(“medical records—written observations from doctors, psychiatrists, nurses and
social workers during and after her hospitalizations since 1999”) to conclude
that these “portray a shy woman bereft of self-esteem, overwhelmed by raising
her five children with little help, yet unable to admit her frustrations or ask for
help.”121
However, this is where the similarities in the narratives of the mothering of
Yates and Her end. In most of the discourse both before and after the verdict,
Yates’s feelings of inadequacy in respect of motherhood have been attributed to
biological abnormality. Yates pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two
charges of capital murder for the deaths of sons Noah and John, and daughter
Mary. Some polls were interpreted as indicating that “more people view Andrea
Yates as psychologically disturbed rather than hopelessly evil,”122 and one legal
commentator, speaking for the American public, proclaimed, “I imagine it’s
hard to find somebody who would say that she was sane at the time of the of-
fense. . . .It’s just got insanity stamped on it in big, bold letters.”123 Yates has been
described as suffering from what is alternatively described as “severe postpar-
tum depression,”124 “a psychotic form of postpartum depression,”125 or “a viru-
lent form of postpartum depression”126 that began after the birth of her fourth
child in February 1999 and worsened after the birth of her fifth. This portrayal
has come from essentially three sources: her family (particularly her husband),
115. A Young Mother, supra note 37.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Mother: Killing Kids, supra note 2.
119. Eagan, supra note 59.
120. Nichols, High-Profile Doctor, supra note 65.
121. Yardley, supra note 62.
122. Lisa Teachey, Most in Poll Prefer Prison to Death for Andrea Yates, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 14,
2001, at 23 (quoting lawyer Brian Wice).
123. Nichols, High-Profile Doctor, supra note 65 (quoting “veteran defense lawyer” Dick
DeGuerin).
124. Killer Mother Suffered Satanic Visions, SCOTSMAN, Sept. 21, 2001, at 8.
125. Cart, supra note 58.
126. Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready For Trial, supra note 7.
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support coalitions (particularly the National Organization of Women (NOW)),
and the media.
In the immediate aftermath of the killings, Russell Yates stated that his wife
was suffering from postpartum depression,127 concluding that “[o]ne side of me
blames her because she did it, but the other side says that she didn’t because
that wasn’t her. . . . She wasn’t in her right frame of mind.”128 Her wider family
also confirmed that she had been treated off and on for severe depression129 over
a two-year period before the deaths.  In the section of his website explaining
Andrea Yates’s defense fund, Russell Yates reiterates the role of biology in his
wife’s crimes  by stating that  “[a]ny funds received in excess of what’s required
to defend Andrea will be donated to causes for women’s mental health issues,
particularly postpartum depression and psychosis.”130 The verdict in the Yates
trial has neither altered Russell Yates’s conviction that his wife was a victim of
her biology nor curbed his public expression of this conviction. Instead, in Rus-
sell Yates’s perception, the verdict has created another source of victimhood for
Andrea Yates: “She’s the victim here not only of the medical community but also
the justice system.”131
NOW has also been particularly instrumental in this portrayal, by charac-
terizing Yates’s experience as an issue concerning the quality of mental health
care for women.132 One commentator went so far as to describe this feminist
support of Yates as an attempt to use her as “a poster child for postpartum de-
pression awareness.”133 However, the loose sense in which “mad” can be em-
ployed and the intermingling of biological and social catalysts for infanticidal
action134 became evident when Diana Lynn-Barnes of the Center for Postpartum
Health stated that: “Women are mad as hell and they are not going to take it
anymore. There’s a vast amount of compassion for Andrea Yates because . . .
they can see how one could go down this road. She’s a victim of a culture that
says women come last.”135 NOW’s insistence on the biological determinants of
Yates’s actions also has continued unabated. For example, the day after the
guilty verdict, NOW President Kim Gandy expressed NOW’s concern regarding
the verdict and “its implications for the one in 1,000 new mothers who will suf-
127. Matt Curry, Pain Abounds When Murder is All in the Family, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A26.
128. Texas Woman Faces Capital Murder Charges in Children’s Drowning Deaths, supra note 67.
129. Neil Davis, Yates a Victim of Our Bloodthirsty Society, DAILY TEXAN, Aug. 31, 2001, available at
http://tspweb02.tsp.utexas.edu/webarchive/08-31-01/2001083104_s02_Yates.html  (last visited Oct.
6, 2002).
130. http://www.yateskids.org/defense-fund.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
131. Yates Controversies Continue (March 16, 2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
03/18/national/main503915.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
132. Paul Duggan, NOW Rallies to Mother’s Defense; Group Says Woman Needs Help, Not Prison, in
Drowning of Five Children, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2001, at A3.
133. Stop Defending Mass Murderer, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 8, 2001, at 16A.
134. See Reece, supra note 90, at 712-13 (noting that medical researchers are unsure whether the
symptoms of postpartum disorders are biological or psychological). See also Bernadette McSherry,
The Return of the Raging Hormones Theory: Premenstrual Syndrome, Postpartum Disorders and Criminal
Responsibility, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 292, 295 (1993) (stating that postpartum disorders can not be solely
attributed to “raging hormones,” but rather appear to be a combination of external and perhaps in-
ternal stressors).
135. Satel, supra note 18.
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fer from postpartum psychosis.”136 After the jury chose a life sentence rather than
the death penalty for Yates, Gandy again expressed her view that Yates is men-
tally ill: “we are particularly concerned when the state pursues the execution of
a person who was obviously mentally ill at the time of the crime. While we be-
lieve that Andrea Yates belongs in a mental health facility rather than prison, we
do thank the jury for sparing her life.”137 This expression of thanks to the jury
and relief at the sentencing outcome further reflect that the jury did not act as
punitively as they might have done in determining Yates’s sentence.
Finally, the media has not only been instrumental in airing the views of
Russell Yates and NOW, but it has also indulged in sensationalist references to
Yates’s two attempted postpartum-depression-induced suicides (one particu-
larly gruesome one in which Yates “scratched at her throat with a steak knife in
search of the carotid artery” and an earlier attempt, in which she ingested 40 to
50 pills of her father’s Alzheimer’s medicine),138 and Yates’s Satanic visions.139
Notably, the reference to Satanic visions has not been construed as evidence of
religious reasons for Yates’s acts (as we might expect with respect to Her if she
had experienced such delusions), but rather as further evidence of Yates’s psy-
chotic state.140 In the aftermath of the verdict in the Yates trial, the media has
continued to reinforce this perception of Yates as a victim of her biology, for ex-
ample, by questioning the reliability of the testimony of a key prosecution wit-
ness, forensic psychiatrist Park Dietz.141 However, interestingly, the media has
also sought to supplement the primary biological account of Yates’s acts with
nonmedical reasons for why the act of killing her children was not really Yates’s
own. These post-verdict attempts to redistribute responsibility for the crime can
be seen, for example, in the media attention to Yates’s Christian minister as a
figure responsible for wielding control over her142 and through the increased
calls for investigations into the culpability of Russell Yates.143
In order to fully understand why the media more readily mobilizes narra-
tives based on “madness” with respect to white infanticidal mothers, it is neces-
sary to consider the functions that are served by attempting to label women,
such as Yates, victims of their biology. The corollary of this analysis is to con-
136. Kim Gandy, Yates Verdict Can Serve As Warning To Prevent Future Tragedies, at http://www.
now.org/press/03-02/03-13a.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2002).
137. Society Must Learn Important Lessons from Andrea Yates Case, at http://www.now.org/press/
03-02/03-15.html (Mar. 15, 2002).
138. Parker, supra note 60.
139. Cart, supra note 58; Pam Easton, Jury Says Yates Fit to Stand Trial, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2001, at 5B; Killer Mother Suffered Satanic Visions, supra note 124; Nichols, Yates Found
Competent, supra note 8; Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready For Trial, supra note 7.
140. See, e.g., Nichols, High-Profile Doctor, supra note 65; Therapist: Texas Mom Not Ready For Trial,
supra note 7.
141. Timothy Roche, Andrea Yates: More to the Story, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/
printout/0,8816,218445,00.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
142. “Going to Hell”: Yates’ Spiritual Adviser Vehemently Warned Followers About Satan (Mar. 26,
2002), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/GMA/GoodMorningAmerica/-GMA030226Yates_
preacher.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
143. Kim Ode, Russell Yates is Also Accountable for this Tragedy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Mar. 24, 2002, available at http://www.startribune.com/stories/859/2115821.html (last visited Apr.
29, 2002).
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sider the results of labeling poor women of color and immigrants as “bad”
mothers.
IV.  WHY WHITE MOTHERS ARE “MAD” AND NON-WHITE MOTHERS ARE “BAD”—
FUNCTIONS OF DIFFERENT EXCULPATORY VOCABULARY
A. Preserving the Maternal Myth
A vocabulary of motive which categorizes white infanticidal mothers as
“mad” is necessary to preserve the white, middle-class myth of motherhood.
First, as mentioned above, killings by white, middle-class mothers present the
greatest threat to the maternal myth. The “repair kit” of exculpatory mecha-
nisms must therefore be more persuasive and absolute with respect to a white,
middle-class mother precisely because it is her criminal acts that represent the
greatest danger to the coherence of the myth that she seems to represent. In this
respect, a biological explanation is desirable because it locates the source of
criminal motive solely in the individual woman144 and prevents her acts from
having wider significance. Rather than the acts being the byproduct of an insidi-
ous cult of motherhood, they are characterized as isolated and contained inci-
dents that can be easily altered145 through medication and therapeutic treatment.
This focus on the subjective personal characteristics of the infanticidal mother, as
opposed to an objective consideration of the act in the abstract, is a feature of de-
fenses, such as insanity, which attempt to provide an excuse for criminal acts
rather than a justification.146
Second, the categorization of a woman as “mad” preserves the patriarchal
perception of marriage, which is central to the ideal of motherhood (discussed
earlier). Labeling a mother “mad” means that the husband can be cast in a role
where he can continue to legitimately offer support to her without appearing to
betray the memory of his children or condone the act. The husband can there-
fore become “father-like” in caring for his sick wife. This reinscribes the notion
that the wife should be dependent on her husband; suggests that the ideal fam-
ily form is indefatigable; and implies that the family should not be subject to the
influence of a law which could potentially hold the woman criminally responsi-
ble and therefore remove her from the purview of her rightful controller. In this
sense, Russell Yates’s pronouncement that his wife is suffering from postpartum
depression, and his unwavering support for her, suggests that the public and the
law have less scope to be judgmental of Yates’s acts (the implication being “if he
can forgive her, then why shouldn’t we”), and seems to valorize the model of a
family which has a supportive father at its head. In direct contrast, when Her’s
estranged husband explicitly stated that Her was not insane, saying “I think she
144. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 57 (1994).
145. But see Tsing, supra note 1, at 295 (discussing how women of color cannot be altered because
“they are identified not as educable products of a defective maturation, but as outside of middle
class, ‘normal’ values”). See generally Richard A. Cloward & Frances F. Piven, Hidden Protest: The
Channeling of Female Innovation and Resistance, 4 SIGNS 651, 668 (1979) (noting that the identification of
a problem as a biological one, as opposed to one of social power structures, quells resistance).
146. Coughlin, supra note 144, at 13.
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is not crazy. . . .  When she’s mad, she could not control herself,”147 and was criti-
cal rather than supportive of Her, the media and the state were given virtual
carte blanche to step in and exercise the punitive control which he himself had
abdicated by virtue of Her being a “bad” mother.148
B. Surveillance Rather than Support
The preceding discussion indicates that the invocation of explanations of
madness for white, middle-class mothers and badness for poor women of color
operates to increase the surveillance of both groups, even though often the type
of surveillance may differ. As discussed above, because white, middle-class
women are more readily presented as victims of their inherent biological proc-
esses,149 they are denied the possibility of autonomous decision making and
looking after themselves. Instead, they are subject to increased surveillance,
preferably by husbands or mental institutions or, less preferably, by judicial
control.150 The media preference for the former in the case of Yates is evident in
one article entitled “Fathers recruited in the fight against postpartum depres-
sion,” which quotes the founder of a postpartum support group at Advocate
Lutheran General Hospital in Park Ridge as stating “[d]ads have got to step up
and take charge.”151
Minority women of color also face increased surveillance, this time more by
the state and the criminal justice system,152 because the problem is perceived as
stemming from the individual or collective failure of the minority culture to
which she belongs.153 In Her’s case, her actions were attributed to cultural factors
in two ways. First, Her’s killing of her children was construed as indicative154 of
147. Curt Brown & Lourdes Medrano Leslie, Mother of Six Fit to Stand Trial, STAR TRIB. (Minnea-
polis-St. Paul), Nov. 14, 1998, at 1B.
148. See generally Coughlin, supra note 144, at 47 (discussing how traditionally law intervened
more in the lives of unmarried women than married women in order to provide the supervision ex-
pected from the absent husband).
149. The corollary of being seen as a victim of biology is the perception that “women are more
susceptible than men to being helpless, crazy and biddable.” PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS
BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN AND THE MYTH OF INNOCENCE 56 (1997).
150. See generally Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 106 (stating that there is an assumption
that white middle-class mothers are more responsive to nonjudicial social controls “than other
groups of mothers”).
151. Mary Beth Sammons, Dads’ Healing Touch: Fathers Recruited in the Fight Against Postpartum
Depression, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2001, at 1.
152. Note also that a third possible surveillor is the elders within the culture. See, e.g., Joy Powell,
Help Is Nearby, STAR. TRIB (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 7, 2000, at 1B (noting that Hmong culture in-
corporates kind mediation and guidance from clan elders).
153. Briggs & Mantini-Briggs, supra note 41, at 306 (noting the irony of the fact that although
culture-based defense strategies resist the imposition of Western norms, these arguments actually
extend the capacity of the criminal justice system to surveil and regulate indigenous groups). See
generally Tsing, supra note 1, at 295 (noting that while the death of a white, middle-class mother’s
child is construed as an isolated event, the same event with respect to a poor woman of color justifies
continual surveillance of her reproductive life); Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 1, at 124 (noting that
this government supervision of poor and minority women is undertaken through child welfare
agencies).
154. See generally Volpp, supra note 48, at 1187 (describing how incidents of violence in minority
communities or the Third World are seen as indicative of those cultures).
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the general problems of integration faced by the Hmong community.155 This at-
tribution ranged from careful comments: “While no one here suggests that the
family’s ethnic background or distinct culture is in any way responsible for the
killings, many here say that the tensions in the family might have been height-
ened by problems within the growing Hmong community in the Twin Cities;”156
to the more explicit: “The shocking case of a young Hmong mother who called
St. Paul police Sept. 3 to report that she had killed her six children, ages 5 to 11,
casts light on the deep social problems among this largely unknown group.”157
Secondly, Her’s actions were more explicitly located in the problems of women
within the Hmong community.158 This idea that gender subordination is an in-
herent part of Hmong culture is evident in one article which states that America
could be seen as a “strange land” because women “are not universally expected
to defer to their husbands,”159 in contrast to Her’s own “ethnic group’s tradition
[which] stresses obedience to one’s husband[.]”160
This focus on culture and gender ignores the noncultural, structural deter-
minants of Her’s experience. This in turn results in less incentive to implement
systemic support structures for minority women.161 At the same time, this por-
trayal of gender subordination as an inherent part of Hmong culture also limits
the extent to which it can be advocated that support structures for all women are
155. See generally Daniela Deane, Promised Land Yields Bitter Fruit for Some, USA TODAY, Oct. 7,
1998, at 10A (quoting William Yang, executive director of the Hmong-American Partnership, a St.
Paul-based, nonprofit organization as stating that “[i]t’s a mess. . . .We Hmong are just not ready to
be in America. Our bodies are here, but our minds aren’t”); Kirsten Scharnberg, Surviving Culture
Shock, BALT. SUN, Mar. 8, 1999, at 22A (describing how this difficulty of integration is something also
felt by Minnesotans); Kimberly Hayes Taylor, Hmong Leaders Meet to Ponder Impact, Reasons for St.
Paul Children’s Death, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 14, 1998, at 6B (referring to a “culture
clash”). This focus on the difficulty of integration necessarily involved the establishment of an es-
sentialist binary which juxtaposed “American culture” with that of the Hmong. The oppositions
were laid out in the following terms: communitarianism versus individualism (for example, one arti-
cle described Her’s arrival in America in the following terms: “In America, she landed in a place that
emphasizes the rights of the individual over that of the group and places a premium on independ-
ence.” Rosalind Bentley & H.J. Cummins, Poverty, Despair, Illness Often Found in Mothers Who Kill,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 5, 1998 at 18A), and agrarian versus industrialist (it was re-
ported that while having a large number of children may be of benefit in an agrarian family it could
“drag down a poor family in America’s cities,” Jeter, supra note 50).
156. Jeter, supra note 50.
157. Deane, supra note 155.
158. See, e.g., Kirsten Scharnberg, supra note 155. Note that the resistance to seeing the incident as
culturally representative came from the community itself. For example, one article reports Hmong
leaders saying that Her’s crime was an isolated case that had tarnished the image of their family-
oriented society: “This is a terrible tragedy, but it is the first time anything like this has happened in
the 20 years we have been in this country. It is so sad, but it is important to remember that this was a
murder, not a Hmong murder, and unfortunately murders happen every day in this country.”
Mother Guilty, supra note 45 (quoting Ying Vang, executive director of the Lao Family Community of
Minnesota).
159. Jeter, supra note 50.
160. Rosalind Bentley & H.J. Cummins, Poverty, Despair, Illness Often Found in Mothers Who Kill,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 5, 1998, at 18A.
161. For example, Lina Jau, a grants analyst for the Minnesota Center for Crime Victim Services,
states that shelters for battered women do not adequately cater to the needs of Hmong women. Jean
Hopfensperger, Task Force Outlines Campaign for Asian Community, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Jan. 15, 1999, at 3B.
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necessary because it diverts scrutiny from the discriminatory practices inherent
in America’s treatment of women.162 Such blindness to the position of women in
American society is evident in the following depiction of Hmong women as
somewhat primitive creatures who have difficulty mastering certain skills which
are essential to their civilizing process: “We teach women basic survival skills
here. . . how to use electrical appliances, what household products are used for.
We help them understand the mail that comes through the door. Most of the
[Hmong] women are still struggling after almost 20 years in this country.”163 The
irony of the fact that it is household tasks in which these women are perceived
to need to be skilled to survive in this liberated, American society seems to be
lost in the commentary.
C. Increased Likelihood of More Lenient Treatment for White Moms
The link between bad mothering and culture/race has more insidious and
immediate consequences for poor women of color. If minority women’s infanti-
cidal acts are defined as being determined by culture rather than biology, the
minority woman theoretically faces two choices. The first is to find the solution
to her situation within herself before the problem occurs (for example, one
reader helpfully suggests that “[a]fter all, Her could have chosen to leave those
children alone, walk out and have a cigarette”).164 It is clear that this “self-help”
option is not a tenable one at all–the need for systemic support structures cannot
be replaced by arguments based on women’s agency, particularly when such
cultural arguments do not permit women such agency in the first place.165 This
same self-help option is less frequently invoked for white infanticidal women
because they are seen as helpless victims of their own biology.  The second pos-
sibility, which applies more frequently, is that the woman is dealt with puni-
tively and dismissively after the event. This situation is evident in the comments
of the judge at the end of Her’s hearing: “This is a tragedy, a real tragedy. . . .
Send her away.”166
This more punitive treatment of poor women of color occurs, as mentioned
earlier, because they are more often denied the opportunity to avail themselves
of the exculpatory label of “madness” that more readily attaches to white moth-
ers. There are a number of reasons why white women are more able to take ad-
vantage of the label of “madness” to secure more lenient treatment.167 The first is
that white, middle-class women effectively have a head start; poor women of
color are already perceived as “bad” mothers before they even commit a crime.
162. Volpp, supra note 48, at 1212.
163. Deane, supra note 155 (quoting Ly Vang, a Hmong refugee and director of the Association
for the Advancement of Hmong Women).
164. Toufong Vang, Letters From Readers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 10, 1998, at 24A.
165. Volpp, supra note 48, at 1211.
166. Mother: Killing Kids, supra note 2.
167. Note that there is a chance that this invocation of the language of victimhood (that is, being
victims of biology) with respect to white infanticidal mothers can result in negative media treatment.
For example, it can invite some commentators to question too easily whether the mother is more of a
victim than the children she has killed. This is evident in the recommendation that people should
“[s]pend time looking at the real victims, starting with those five little coffins in Texas.” Stop De-
fending Mass Murderer, supra note 133.
HUCKERBY.DOC 09/29/03  9:53 AM
170 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 10:147 2003
Second, as discussed above, there are ulterior ideological motivations for attrib-
uting the infanticidal acts of white women to their biology and thereby keeping
intact the ideal norms of motherhood. Thirdly, the emphasis on biology for
white mothers, compared with the emphasis on race and culture in the portrayal
of minority mothers, creates an “us versus them” narrative168 in which it is easier
to come down on the side of the hapless and helpless victim of her hormones. In
other words, expressing empathy for a “mad” mother is less controversial than
empathy for a mother of a different race/culture/class perceived to have killed
her children because she could not get the task of mothering right. This disparity
is evidenced by the fact that sentiments of “empathy” with Yates’s plight have
been expressed far more frequently than they were in relation to Her. For exam-
ple, in an interview with Good Morning America, Rosie O’Donnell expressed
“overwhelming empathy” for Yates, stating that “[w]hen you’ve been on the
edge you can understand what it’s like to go over.”169
The fact that it is easier to politicize medical issues, which are ostensibly
applicable to all women, also means that the plight of white women is more
likely to be taken up as a “cause” by political movements. This support from
interest groups is evident in the fact that NOW justified their support of Yates170
on the basis that this was a general women’s health issue. By becoming the
“cause” of such movements, white, middle-class mothers like Yates are likely to
be treated more leniently for their crimes due to the increased support and
available resources. At the same time, this politicization also has exclusionary
effects that operate to the detriment of minority women who kill their children.
By definition, making one woman’s situation a “cause” or rendering the per-
sonal political necessarily demands generalization from the particular, individ-
ual experience of women to the common experience of womanhood.171 However,
making any one shared experience (in this case postpartum depression) the plat-
form for action results in a denial of heterogeneity and a reductive notion of
womanhood.172 This essentialism becomes exclusionary, in the sense that women
who cannot as easily lay claim to that experience (in this case poor women of
color) risk not receiving the full extent of support extended to “mad moms.”
This general exclusion of women of color from feminist agendas has been noted
elsewhere.173 In addition, the risk that certain women will be excluded from the
168. Volpp, supra note 48, at 1186-87.
169. Michael Starr, I Feel for Mom Who Killed Kids: Rosie Tells Sawyer How She Suffered, N.Y. POST,
Aug. 10, 2001, at 105.
170. For example, NOW formed the Andrea Pia Yates Support Coalition to help collect money
for a legal defense fund, held a candlelight vigil on the eve of Yates’s competency hearing, and held
an educational forum on postpartum mental illness the next day; see Duggan, supra note 132; Satel,
supra note 18.
171. Renate Duelli-Klein, How to Do What We Want to Do: Thoughts About Feminist Methodology, in
THEORIES OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 48, 54 (Gloria Bowles & Renate Duelli-Klein eds., 1983).
172. NGAIRE NAFFINE, FEMINISM AND CRIMINOLOGY 53 (1997). On the intersectional nature of
women’s experience see generally, ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 165 (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
173. Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from the Battered Women’s
Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 182-83 (1996). See generally Esther
Ngan-Ling Chow, The Feminist Movement: Where are All the Asian American Women?, in FROM
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selected “experience” increases when that experience is referable to medical cri-
teria. For example, it has been observed that the conditions of “learned helpless-
ness” and “cycle of violence” that constitute the Battered Woman Syndrome174
operate to the detriment of those women who kill their abusers but have not
conformed exactly to the behavioral model established.175
Finally, white, middle-class mothers are more likely to be able to show that
they conform to the behavioral model as a matter of practicality.  At a basic
level, being able to afford diagnosis is a necessary step for a problem to be medi-
calized. As one editorial queried, “[s]ometimes I wonder if the reaction to this
case would be different if Yates weren’t so well-educated, so affluent, so much
like you and me and the mommy next door. What if she were poor? Lacking the re-
sources to get medical attention at all, let alone back-to-back hospital stays and more
anti-psychotic drugs than we can keep track of?”176 (emphasis added). The absence of
a “diagnosed history of depression”177 (emphasis added) was damning for Her.
This need for formal labels is evident in the one newspaper article which sur-
mises that “[t]hough Her’s lawyers would have argued she suffered from a long
period of untreated depression had the case gone to trial, her lack of an estab-
lished psychiatric profile limited [the prosecutor’s] sympathy.”178 The require-
ment of a formal diagnosis is likely to increase in the future.  One recent study
has concluded that jurors are becoming more skeptical of the scientific basis of
madness claims.179 This will mean a greater reliance on expert testimony,180 which
DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 184 (Ronald Takaki ed., 2d ed.
1994).
174. Battered Woman Syndrome was identified by Lenore Walker in order to “explain why the
battered woman becomes a victim in the first place and how the process of victimization is perpetu-
ated to the point of psychological paralysis.” LENORE WALKER, THE  BATTERED WOMAN 43 (1979). See
also Lenore Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 526 (1977) (finding
earlier explanations for abusive relationships incomplete and noting that “a combination of socio-
logical and psychological variables account for the existence of the battered woman syndrome”). The
elements of Battered Woman Syndrome are a “cycle of violence” (a predictable cyclical pattern of
abuse consisting of three stages: tension building, the acute battering incident, and loving contrition)
with which the woman becomes familiar and also dependent on, such that she develops a condition
of “learned helplessness” in which she is unable to leave her abusive spouse. See LENORE WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE 42-45 (1989); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-97 (1984).
175. The naming of the problem as a “syndrome” and the subsequent oversimplified perception
by judges and juries of the conditions said to make up Battered Women’s Syndrome excludes a
number of women from availing themselves of the defense. See David L. Faigman, The Battered
Women Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 644 (1986) (noting
the danger of employing the word “syndrome” and “us[ing] one theoretical construct to describe all
[abused] women); Christine Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on
Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (1989). In addition, the medical criteria of Battered
Woman Syndrome are often interpreted through cultural and social stereotypes, which can be par-
ticularly detrimental to poor women of color. See, e.g., Sharon Angela Allard, Rethinking Battered
Women’s Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 197 (1991) (suggesting
that because black women are stereotyped as aggressive, their actions in defense against a batterer
are more likely to be interpreted as motivated by revenge rather than fear).
176. Sherry Thomas, Furor About Yates Rages On, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at 1.
177. See Tolson, supra note 17.
178. Id.
179. Finkel, supra note 20, at 1120.
180. Reece, supra note 90, at 744 (stating that the credibility of the expert on postpartum disorders
is critical for three reasons: the uncertainty in the scientific community about postpartum depression
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will have to be credible enough to overcome the fact that law and science are not
necessarily aligned with respect to infanticide.181 This phenomenon can be ob-
served in relation to Yates’s competency hearing, which was characterized as
“three days of testimony that boiled down to a battle of experts.”182 As credible
defense experts are not cheap, the availability of the insanity defense to poor
women of color is likely to be severely circumscribed.
V.  CONCLUSION
A more complicated picture of infanticidal mothers emerges when attempts
are made to analyze how the distinctions between white, middle-class women
and poor women of color and between “mad” and “bad” mothers converge to
structure the explanatory narratives for mothers who kill in the media. A com-
parative study of the media treatment of Her and Yates makes it clear that the
general tendency to afford more lenient treatment to women who fit the middle-
class ideal of motherhood, manifests itself in relation to infanticidal mothers,
and results in the tendency to label white, married mothers “mad” and poor
women of color “bad.” This tendency is apparent even when these two groups
of women describe essentially the same frustration and difficulties with the ex-
perience of motherhood. The fact that this pattern of disparate treatment persists
in cases of infanticide is, at first blush, quite anomalous. If punishment of
women offenders is measured by how much they deviate from the ideal norm of
motherhood, then one would expect that by killing their children, the grossest
violation of the maternal myth, any distinctions based on race, culture, and class
which may have afforded different treatment would be obliterated in favor of
harsh treatment across the board. The fact that this does not result, and that
more lenient treatment is instead secured for white mothers through the invoca-
tion of biological discourse, only makes sense if one considers the functions that
are served by invoking different types of explanations for different types of
mothers. Specifically, the result of these different labels is the preservation of the
ideal norms of motherhood and the substitution of surveillance (whether by
husbands, medical institutions, prison or the state) for the implementation of
far-reaching support structures for women having difficulty dealing with the
pressures of motherhood. Finally, the lack of uniform media treatment evi-
dences how particularly omnipotent ideas about race, culture, class, and marital
status are in determining how painful the fall from motherhood is for women
who kill their children.
and postpartum psychosis; the skepticism of an emotional jury; and the rarity of occurrence of post-
partum psychosis). See also Robyn Lansdowne, Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining Process,
16 MONASH U. L. REV. 41, 49 (1990) (stating that in the Australian context, psychiatric assessments in
infanticide cases that have gone to trial have had an “enormous influence” on case outcomes).
181. Dobson & Sales, supra note 84, at 1109 (discussing the English Infanticide Act).
182. Nichols, Yates Found Competent, supra note 8.
